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THE LIMITS OF ANALOGY: A CRITIQUE
OF THE RIGHT TO MEDICAL SELF-DEFENSE
0. Carter Snead*
Responding to Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited
Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1813 (2007).
Professor Volokh has produced a characteristically thoughtful, pro-
vocative, and well-argued case for a constitutional right to "medical
self-defense" that would presumptively allow terminally ill patients ac-
cess to unapproved drugs' and to purchase organs for transplant from
willing sellers - activities that are presently illegal. His project is
animated by one of the highest human aspirations, namely, to alleviate
the suffering caused by dreaded diseases. He seeks to ground the un-
enumerated right to medical self-defense in the common law justifica-
tion of self-defense (traditionally understood), which, he argues, has
been extended to the medical context by virtue of the jurisprudence of
abortion.
Professor Volokh's project stands or falls with the claim that the
entitlement he proposes is of constitutional dimension. If there is no
fundamental right to medical self-defense, the individual must, for bet-
ter or worse, yield to the regulation of this domain in the name of the
values agreed to by the political branches of government. Indeed, the
government routinely restricts the instrumentalities of self-help (includ-
ing self-defense) in the name of avoiding what it takes to be more sig-
nificant harms. This same rationale accounts for current governmen-
tal limitations on access to unapproved drugs and the current ban on
organ sales. The FDA restricts access to unapproved drugs (subject to
certain exceptions) in the interest of public health, that is, to prevent
patient exposure to unsafe or ineffective drugs and to maintain a func-
* Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School and former General Counsel for the Presi-
dent's Council on Bioethics. Many thanks to John Finnis, Rick Garnett, Nicole Garnett, Bill Kel-
ley, Gerry Bradley, John Robinson, Yuval Levin, Rob Mikos, and Leigh Fitzpatrick Snead.
1 In his Essay, Professor Volokh argues that terminally ill patients should have access to drugs
that have passed Phase I of the FDA approval process (i.e., testing for minimal safety (but not
efficacy) sufficient to proceed to the subsequent phases clinical trial process, which involve larger
samples of human subjects). Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental
Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. ISI3 (2007). However, Volokh argues
that the right to medical self defense would, in principle, also entail access to drugs that have not
been tested for safety. Id. at 1830 n.79.
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tional clinical trial system (the chief mechanism of bringing safe and
effective drugs to the market).2 Congress banned the sale of organs to
avoid what it took to be a number of practical and ethical harms, in-
cluding coercion of the poor and commodification of the body and its
parts.3  The only way for the individual to avoid the political process
and substitute his own normative balancing of these goods and harms
for that of the government, is to do so pursuant to a fundamental con-
stitutional right. Thus, for Professor Volokh's project to succeed, he
must demonstrate that the right he proposes is "objectively, deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition and implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist
if they were sacrificed."4
This Article examines Professor Volokh's case for a fundamental
right to medical self-defense, and concludes that none of his suggested
common law grounds are adequate to justify it. Self-defense is not a
fitting analogy to, and thus does not provide support for, this entitle-
ment. The doctrine of necessity (or choice of evils) is a more promising
common law analogy, but it is also an unsound foundation. Lacking
any roots in the nation's history and tradition, the entitlement to medi-
cal self-help cannot, therefore, rise to the level of a fundamental consti-
tutional right.
I. MEDICAL SELF-DEFENSE GROUNDED IN
ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE?
Professor Volokh's argument is elegant and straightforward. He
begins by affirming the arguments made by some commentators that
there is a substantive due process right to lethal self-defense grounded
in longstanding tradition (dating back to the founding era), enshrined
in forty-four state constitutions, and perhaps implied by the Second
Amendment.6 He turns next to the jurisprudence of abortion in an ef-
fort to extend this right to the medical domain. He characterizes Roe
v. Wade' and Planned Parenthood v. Casey8 as establishing two rights
2 See, e.g., Mary Ann Liebert, FDA Proposes New Rulesfor Access to Experimental Drugs, 26
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 16, 16 (2007).
3 See S. REP. No. 98-382, at 2 (1984). For a philosophical case against commodification of
the body and its parts, see Gilbert Meilaender, Organ Procurement: What are the Questions?
(June 2006), http://www.bioethics.gov/background/meilaender organs.html.
4 Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3 d 695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (apparently quoting
without citation to Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)); see id. (adding that
such rights must be delineated with a high degree of specificity); see also Volokh, supra note i, at
i88-19 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (1997)).
5 It is therefore unnecessary to explore whether such an entitlement is "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
6 See Volokh, supra note i, at 1820-21.
7 41o U.S. 113 (1973).
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to abortion. The first is rooted in reproductive liberty that "generally
allows previability abortions for all women who choose them." The
second right, Professor Volokh argues, is grounded in medical self-
defense which permits abortions at all gestational stages (i.e., pre- and
post-viability) in order "to preserve the life or health of the mother."10
He concludes that if a woman's interests in preserving her own life
outweigh the state's interest in a viable fetus's life, then surely the
same right to self-defense would permit a dying patient access to less
grave self-help measures, including the purchase of unapproved drugs
or organs for transplantation.1' In Professor Volokh's words,
"[n]othing about therapeutic postviability abortion makes it deserve
protection more than any other medical self-defense procedure."12
Despite the facial appeal of the argument, the invocation of abor-
tion precedents is not a promising point of departure to establish a
more general right to medical self-defense. To begin, Professor Vo-
lokh's hope that his theory will gain wide political purchase is under-
mined by grounding it in perhaps the most controversial line of deci-
sions in modern constitutional history. In fairness, Professor Volokh's
arguments focus on the least contentious aspect of this jurisprudence
(namely, the "life exception" which, as he notes, enjoys wide political
support), but this is probably not sufficient to avoid the polarizing ef-
fects that the larger subject of abortion provokes.
Mining the law of abortion for a generalizable right to medical self-
defense is problematic for several deeper reasons. First, it is not clear
that the right to post-viability abortion "share[s] the same moral
core"' 3 as the right to lethal self-defense, such that the former is a fit-
ting analytic foundation for a broader right to medical self-defense.
The right to post-viability abortion is not rooted in self-defense princi-
ples. It is true that Casey held that states may regulate or even pro-
scribe abortion after viability, provided that any such restriction in-
clude an exception for the life or health of the mother. But Casey left
undisturbed the capacious definition of "health" articulated in Doe v.
Bolton'4 that includes a wide array of interests related to a woman's
well-being, including "physical, emotional, psychological, [and] famil-
ial" factors." This definition (and the rule it animates) strongly privi-
leges a woman's well-being, broadly understood, over the interest the
state has in viable fetal human life. This is confirmed by the fact that
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9 Volokh, supra note i, at 1824.
1o Id. (quoting Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64; Casey, 505 U.S. at 846).
11 Id. at 1826.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1825-26.
14 410 U.S. 179 (19 .3).
15 Id. at 192.
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several federal courts have invalidated bans on post-viability abortions
because they lacked exceptions for "serious non-temporary threat[s] to
[a] pregnant woman's mental health."16
Whatever principle is at work here, it does not resemble the right
to lethal self-defense, traditionally understood. As Professor Volokh
acknowledges,'7 that right justifies the use of deadly force when it
seems (to a reasonable person) necessary and proportionate to avert
death or serious bodily injury. Threats to mental health (much less to
familial interests) are never sufficient to justify lethal self-defense. But
such interests are adequate to justify the termination of a viable fetus,
which, in Professor Volokh's opinion "is in many ways indistinguish-
able from a born baby.""' Thus, the right to post-viability abortions
seems to be an unfit foundation for a circumscribed right to medical
self-defense applicable "only in the face of deadly or at least radically
debilitating threats."'a
Professor Volokh suggests in a footnote that the aspect of abortion
jurisprudence driving his analysis is the widely accepted right to ter-
minate a viable fetus when necessary to defend one's life .20 But as is
evident from above, that exception is imbedded in a much more
sweeping right; it is one narrow application of an expansive license to
abort post-viable fetuses in the name of a woman's health (broadly
construed). In other words, the "life exception" is not the defining fea-
ture of the right to postviability abortion.
Second, the Court's most recent decision, Gonzales v. Carhart2'
(announced after Professor Volokh's Essay went to press), appears to
recalibrate the closely related "health exception" in a way that seems to
undermine Professor Volokh's thesis. In Carhart, the Court signaled
its willingness to defer to legislative judgment about the medical ne-
cessity of certain interventions in the face of objections by individuals
(supported by substantial but contested medical authority) that the
policy adopted might be harmful to human health. This is an inver-
sion of the priority of judgment (as between government and citizen)
that the principle of medical self-defense envisions.
Carhart seems to represent a departure from the virtually absolute
privilege of a woman's health over the state's interest in promoting re-
spect for fetal human life. The Court entertained a facial challenge to
a federal law banning the
16 Women's Med. Prof 1 Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3 d 187, 209 (6th Cir. 199).
17 See Volokh, supra note I, at 1821.
18 Id. at 1827.
19 Id. at 1821.
20 See id. at 1824 n-56.
21 127 S. Ct. 16io, 1639 (2007).
[VOL. 1214
MEDICAL SELF-DEFENSE
deliberate[] and intentional[] vaginal[] deliver[y] [of] a living fetus until, in
the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the
body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the
fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the pur-
pose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the par-
tially delivered living fetus. 22
The Court affirmed the constitutionality of the ban despite the fact
that it lacked a "health exception." 23  Medical experts disagreed
whether a situation ever might arise in which the prohibited procedure
would be necessary to preserve a woman's health 24 - no evidence of
actual cases of necessity was presented to any of the trial courts below.
Opponents of the law argued that there were imaginable circum-
stances in which the procedure would be the safest method of abor-
tion; defenders retorted that there were always safe alternatives avail-
able (including the in utero killing of the fetus followed by intact
dilation and extraction). Contrary to its decision in Stenberg v.
Carhart,25 the Court held that "[m]edical uncertainty does not foreclose
the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than
it does in other contexts."26 Thus, it affirmed the facial validity of the
law in a five-to-four decision (the same margin as Stenberg, decided
seven years earlier).
Carhart is particularly noteworthy in that the government interest
cited for the abortion restriction was not the direct preservation of fe-
tal human life. 2 7 Rather, the law aimed to promote respect for human
life, to prevent the coarsening and numbing of society's moral sense,
and to safeguard the integrity of the medical profession by banning
what Congress judged to be a particularly shocking and brutal proce-
dure bearing a striking resemblance to infanticide. 28 In other words,
the purpose of the law was actually to prevent the moral degradation
22 Id. at 1624.
23 Id. at 1639. This holding is in deep tension with the 2000 decision Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914 (2000), which struck down a very similar array of state statutes because, among other
defects, they lacked an exception for a woman's health.
24 Note that the contours of the "health exception" have been subtly altered since their an-
nouncement in Doe v. Bolton. Originally, the triggering event for the health exception was a de-
termination by the abortion provider that an abortion is necessary to promote a particular
woman's well-being under the circumstances. In Stenberg v. Carhart, the health exception was
triggered "if substantial medical authority supports the proposition that banning a particular pro-
cedure could endanger women's health." 530 U.S. at 938. Thus, the health exception is impli-
cated in purely elective abortions when the safest option is taken off the table by a particular gov-
ernmental restriction.
25 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
26 Id. at 1637.
27 Indeed, the Court's decision seemed premised in part on the proposition that there were safe
alternative means of abortion for the same class of women who might prefer the prohibited pro-
cedure.
28 Carhart, 127 S. Ct at 1633-35.
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of society. The Court thus held that the governmental interest in pre-
venting this moral harm outweighed the individual's belief that a par-
ticular abortion procedure might be necessary for her health. 2 9
The Court's balancing of interests in Carhart does not bode well
for the proposed right to medical self-defense. It suggests that while
the choice for abortion is vested squarely with the woman, the means
of abortion is subject to governmental oversight, and can be limited
(within reason) in the name of moral considerations, even over the ob-
jection that the preferred prohibited procedure might be the safest op-
tion.3 0  This seems in tension with the spirit of the entitlement es-
poused in Professor Volokh's Essay. 31
II. IS SELF DEFENSE THE RIGHT ANALOGY?
Abortion jurisprudence is not a sound foundation for the right to
medical self-defense. There may, however, be an even more funda-
mental problem with the project as presently conceived by Professor
Volokh. The New Jersey Supreme Court wrote in a landmark medical
ethics case that "analogy is the vessel that carries meaning from old to
new in the law."32 Granting for the sake of argument that there is a
fundamental unenumerated right to lethal self-defense, it seems that
this is materially different from the kind of entitlement Professor Vo-
lokh argues for in the medical domain. For the reasons set forth be-
low, the traditional justification for use of force in self-protection is
dis-analogous to a right of access to illegal instrumentalities of self-help
in the name of combating a terminal illness. Moreover, even if one
were to reconceptualize medical intervention as a species of justified
force against an aggressor, there may be reasons not to do so.
29 One might argue that it is ironic that Justice Kennedy would find such moral considerations
sufficient to support the ban on partial birth abortions, given that in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003), he wrote that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed
a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice." Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 186, 216 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing)).
3o The Court has affirmed additional governmental limitations on the manner in which abor-
tions are performed. See, e.g., Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 5o6 (1983) (upholding a state law
requiring that second trimester abortions be performed in a licensed hospital).
31 It must be noted that because Carhart was a facial challenge to a restrictive abortion law,
the disagreement over medical necessity was abstract and speculative. The Court left open the
possibility that in an as-applied challenge (involving an actual case of concrete health risks) gov-
ernment interests and a woman's health might be balanced differently. See Carhart, 127 S. Ct at
1638-39.
32 In re Grady, 426 A. 467, 473 (N.J. 1981) (setting forth the framework for analyzing requests
for sterilization of individuals incapable of consent).
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A. The Use of Reasonable Force to Repel an Aggressor?
Traditional self-defense is conceived of as a "use of force justifiable
for protection of the person."33 According to the Model Penal Code,
"the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose
of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other
person on the present occasion."34 This account does not seem to fit
the scenario in which a terminally ill patient is seeking access to unap-
proved drugs or to purchase organs for transplantation. Fundamen-
tally, self-defense is conceived as a justification for the use of force to
repel the application of force by another. What "use of force upon or
toward another person" is in play here? What "unlawful force" is be-
ing brought to bear on the patient such that he has the right to meet it
with proportional force? Professor Volokh rules out the possibility that
the right he proposes would justify using force to obtain either unap-
proved drugs or organs for transplantation from people who are not
the source of the threat to the patient.3 1 He does not appear to be re-
ferring to the use of force against the federal agents who might try to
intervene to prevent the distribution of unapproved drugs or the sale
of organs. In fact, the Model Penal Code takes the position that use of
force is not justified "to resist an arrest that the actor knows is being
made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful."3 6 The enti-
tlement at the heart of Professor Volokh's project seems to be
grounded in a different principle. Of this, more later.
The principle of self-defense is squarely concerned with justifying
the use of force that would otherwise be unlawful. The proposed right
to medical self-defense does not involve the use of force against an ag-
gressor, but rather the freedom to acquire certain instrumentalities of
therapeutic self-help. It would thus seem that self-defense is not a
fruitful analogy.
B. The Perils of Metaphor: The "War" on Disease and Death
The analogy could be restored, however, by re-characterizing the
relevant threat to the patient seeking to invoke the right to medical
self-defense. That is, the disease itself might be understood to be a
kind of aggressor. President Nixon illustrated this concept in 97i
when he declared "war on cancer" as he signed The National Cancer
33 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(l) (1985).
34 Id.
35 Volokh, supra note i, at 1821.
36 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i) (1985).
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Act.37 Politicians make such rhetorical moves all the time, but it
seems that one should be particularly cautious about invoking such a
metaphor in the medical context.
While the invocation of "war on disease" might be a colorful way to
express how seriously we regard our obligations to alleviate human
suffering and combat disease, it is conceptually and morally problem-
atic. "War" is a state of emergency in which the usual moral norms
and even laws are often altered to meet threatening exigencies. It is
the realm of exceptions, not rules. As Hans Jonas has written:
[I]n time of war our society itself supersedes the nice balance of the social
contract with an almost absolute precedence of public necessities over in-
dividual rights. In this and similar emergencies, the sacrosanctity of the
individual is abrogated, and what for all practical purposes amounts to a
near-totalitarian, quasi-Communist state of affairs is temporarily permitted
to prevail. In such situations, the community is conceded the right to
make calls on its members, or certain of its members, entirely different in
magnitude and kind from the calls normally allowed. It is deemed right
that a part of the population bears a disproportionate burden of risk of a
disproportionate gravity; and it is deemed right that the rest of the com-
munity accepts this sacrifice, whether voluntary or enforced, and reaps its
benefits - difficult as we find it to justify this acceptance and this benefit
by any normal ethical categories. We justify it transethically, as it were,
by the supreme collective emergency, formalized, for example, by the dec-
laration of a state of war.38
The conception of disease as a lethal aggressor to be vanquished by
means of force opens the door to what one commentator has described
"the provisional morality of crisis" in which "all stops are pulled, and
all tactics are permitted."39 Disease, however, is a foe that will never
be defeated. We are thus left in a state of perpetual emergency; per-
manently in the sphere of exceptions rather than rules. Taken to an
extreme, this attitude might be corrosive of ethical safeguards crucial
to the respect for persons in the realm of biomedical research - most
obviously, the protections for human subjects. This temptation is re-
flected in the words of Dr. Francis Moore, past Chair of the Depart-
ment of Surgery at Harvard Medical School: "By . . . protecting the
individual patient, [the researcher] is exposing society to the hazard of
a static rather than dynamic medicine."40
37 See National Cancer Institute, Milestone (1971), http://dtp.nci.nih.gov/timeline/noflash/
milestones/M4_Nixon.htm
38 Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, in
EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS I, 6-7 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1970).
39 Yuval Levin, The Crisis of Everyday Life, THE NEW ATLANTIS, Fall/Winter 2005, at
119-21.
40 Francis D. Moore, Therapeutic Innovation: Ethical Boundaries in the Initial Clinical Trials
of New Drugs and Surgical Procedures, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS, Su-
pm note 38, at 358, 365 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1970).
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This is obviously not to say that medical therapies should not be
pursued with the utmost vigor and focus. Undoubtedly they should.
It is only to note that re-conceptualizing disease as an aggressor seek-
ing to kill innocents carries with it certain perils that may counsel rhe-
torical restraint.
C. A Fitting Analogy: The Justification of Necessity
The entitlement Professor Volokh proposes does not fit comfortably
within the traditional common law doctrine of self-defense for the rea-
sons stated above. But another common law doctrine, namely the jus-
tification of necessity (also referred to as "choice of evils"), seems to be
quite a close analogue to the proposed right to medical self-defense. 41
According to the Model Penal Code:
Conduct [contrary to law] that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a
harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the
harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and (b)
neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or
defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and (c) a legislative
purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly ap-
pear.42
This framework seems to capture the spirit of the claim that pa-
tients facing death should be empowered balance this evil with that of
otherwise unlawful conduct (such as the use of unapproved drugs or
the purchase of organs). Indeed, the Comment section of MPC sec-
tion 3.02 illustrates the contours of the necessity defense with several
examples drawn from the medical context. For example, the Comment
notes that "a druggist may dispense a drug without the requisite pre-
scription to alleviate grave distress in an emergency,"4 3 and "a ship's
captain may enter a forbidden port if medical treatment on shore is
necessary to save a crewman's life."44 Indeed, the case of therapeutic
abortion is used to illustrate the principle of necessity in a regime that
otherwise forbids "unlawful termination of a pregnancy."1
Is the common law defense of necessity sufficient to anchor a con-
stitutional right to medical self-help? It would seem not, for several
41 Volokh asserts that "not much logically turns on" the choice to style his proposal as an in-
stance of self-defense rather than an instance of necessity. Volokh, supra note i, at 1815 n.6. The
discussion set forth in this section illustrates that the two justifications are quite distinct both in
their contours as well as their limiting principles.
42 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(I) (1985).
43 Id. cmt. i at o.
44 Id. at 12.
45 Id. at 13.
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reasons. Necessity is highly controversial and disfavored, particularly
when applied to a regime that is governed by statute46 (e.g., the Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), or the National Organ Transplant
Act). But even necessity's own internal limiting principles seem to rule
out a right to medical self-help, at least as applied to the instrumentali-
ties of unapproved drugs and organs for sale.
First, the individual must believe in good faith that the unlawful
act will remedy the greater evil. "It is not enough that the actor be-
lieves that his behavior possibly may be conducive to ameliorating cer-
tain evils; he must believe it is "'necessary"' to avoid the evils." 47 This
seems not to be the case where a patient seeks access to drugs that
have passed only Phase I of the FDA approval process (i.e., clinical
testing on a small sample of human subjects to demonstrate minimal
safety (not efficacy) sufficient to proceed to the later stages of the ap-
proval process). Such drugs have not yet been proven effective.48 In
the face of such uncertainty, it would be difficult to claim that access
to such drugs was believed in good faith to be "necessary" to preserve
one's life. It seems more accurate to say that in cases like this, termi-
nally ill patients strongly hope (with some evidence derived from ani-
mal models) that the experimental unapproved therapy will yield some
benefit. But this does not seem sufficient for the exacting criteria of
certainty prescribed by the doctrine of necessity.
Second, and most fatal to a right to medical self-help grounded in
necessity, is the limiting principle that the justification may not be in-
voked in cases where the legislature has already spoken to the "deter-
mination of values" that the individual is seeking to balance for him-
self.49 Because the necessity defense essentially allows people to act
"as individual legislatures, amending a particular criminal provision,
or crafting a one-time exception to it, subject to court review, when a
real legislature would formally do the same under those circum-
stances," 0 it is unavailable when the real legislature has already spo-
ken to the proper disposition of the choice of evils in question. Thus,
an appeal to necessity would not be an available defense where termi-
46 See e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001)
("[U]nder our constitutional system, in which federal crimes are defined by statute rather than by
common law . . . [necessity] is especially [controversial].").
47 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 Cit. 2, at 12 (1985) (emphasis added).
48 A recent study has shown that less than thirty-three percent of cancer drugs that pass Phase
I of the approval process advance to Phase III. See Peter D. Jacobson & Wendy E. Parmet, A
New Era of Unapproved Drugs: The Case of Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, 297 JAMA 205,
206 (2007) (noting that only five percent of cancer drugs that begin the clinical trial process are
finally approved for patient use.
49 See Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 491 (citation omitted).
5o Raich v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 154i59, at *io (9 th Cir. Mar. 14, 2007) (quoting U.S. v. Schoon,
971 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9 th Cir. 19i)).
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nally ill patients seek access to unapproved drugs given the ample evi-
dence that the FDCA has already balanced the competing values at
stake. According to FDA Commissioner Andrew von Eschenbach, the
approval framework set forth under that statute is meant "to enable
many more patients who lack satisfactory alternatives to have access
to unapproved medicines, while balancing the need for safeguarding
the individual patient . . . [and] to ensure the continued integrity of the
scientific process that brings safe and effective drugs to the market."1
Thus, for better or worse, this seems to be a domain in which the legis-
lature has already made the relevant "determination of values" at
stake. The same could be said for the laws governing organ procure-
ment; the Senate Report accompanying the National Organ Transplant
Act reflects a balancing of the costs and benefits of permitting the sale
of organs.5 2
Given these limitations on the necessity defense it is not surprising
that there is no history or tradition of courts privileging the prefer-
ences of patients (including those suffering from terminal illnesses) for
a particular prohibited medical intervention over governmental con-
cerns about public health. To the contrary, the record reflects a consis-
tent deference to governmental judgment about such matters. In
Rutherford v. United States, 3 the Tenth Circuit noted that "the deci-
sion by the patient whether to have a treatment or not is a protected
right, but his selection of a particular treatment, or at least a medica-
tion [in this case an unapproved cancer drug], is within the area of
governmental interest in protecting public health."54 In Oakland Can-
nabis, the Supreme Court rejected the invocation of necessity to avoid
the strictures of the Controlled Substances Act in an effort to secure
access to medical marijuana." Similarly, in the recently decided Raich
v. Gonzales, 6 the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim of necessity as well as
a substantive due process "right to make a life-shaping decision on a
physician's advice to use medical marijuana to preserve bodily integ-
rity, avoid intolerable pain, and preserve life, when all other prescribed
medications and remedies have failed."" Most recently, in the case
51 Liebert, supra note 2, at16. Indeed, the FDA provides a regime of access to experimental
drugs through the clinical trial system and other expanded access programs. See, e.g., Meghan K.
Talbott, The Implications of Expanding Access to Unapproved Drugs, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 316
(2007) (describing the present regulatory framework). This regime would seem to constitute a
statutory "exception," the existence of which would rule out a necessity defense.
52 See S. REP. No. 98-382 (1984) (weighing the expanded access to organs that a market would
bring against the possible abuses of commodification of body parts).
53 616 F.2d 455 (1980).
54 Id. at 457.
55 532 U.S. at 491.
56 2007 WL 754759 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2007).
57 Id. at *14.
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that perhaps inspired Professor Volokh's Essay, Abigail Alliance v. von
Eschenbachj the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc held that the common
law defense of necessity did not support a substantive due process
right of terminally ill patients to have access to drugs that merely
passed Phase I trials.)9
III. CONCLUSION
Professor Volokh makes compelling arguments against the present
FDA drug approval framework and the current ban on organ sales. 60
He marshals impressive evidence that they are ineffective in meeting
the needs of terminally ill patients. He proposes less restrictive ap-
proaches that would arguably serve such patients better. But he fails
to establish that his policy judgment should override the considered
judgment of the democratic branches of the federal government by vir-
tue of an unenumerated right to medical self-help. Such a right cannot
be grounded in abortion jurisprudence, or the common law justifica-
tions of self defense or necessity. Lacking any objective foundation in
the Nation's history and tradition, the entitlement to medical self-help
does not rise to the level of fundamental constitutional right. Thus, as
with other contested matters in a morally pluralistic society, this issue
must be resolved in the public square through the democratic process.
495 F.3 d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
59 Id. at 702. The court likewise rejected the arguments that such a fundamental right could
be inferred from the common law doctrine of self-defense or the tort of interference with rescue.
60 Though I would respectfully suggest that he does not grapple fully with the philosophical
case against the sale of organs made by Leon Kass, which is not simply an appeal to visceral re-
vulsion, but rather is animated by a particular view of the importance of embodiment and the
ethical perils of regarding the human person either as simply an aggregate of parts that can be
freely alienated (a kind of materialism) or simply a mind that happens to be housed in a body that
is purely instrumental (a kind of dualism). See LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE
DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS 177-200 (2002). This argument is
further elaborated by Meilaender. See Meilaender, supra note 3. Obviously, Volokh may not find
this argument at all persuasive, but he does not seem to address it on its own terms.
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